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Overview 
 Challenges of securing open architecture 
(OA) systems 
 Specifying security requirements for 
software systems 
 Case study: Specifying secure software 
product lines within an OA software 
ecosystem for enterprise systems 
 Discussion and conclusions 
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Challenges of securing open 
architecture (OA) systems 
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Security challenges 
 Security threats to software systems are increasingly 
multi-modal and distributed across system 
components. 
 Physically isolated systems are vulnerable to external 
security attacks, via portable storage devices like USB 
drives, modified end-user devices, and social 
engineering techniques. 
 What makes an OA system secure changes over time, 
as new threats emerge and systems evolve. 
 Need an approach to continuously assure the security 
of evolving OA systems that is practical, scalable, 
robust, tractable, and adaptable. 
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Software systems/components 
evolve: what to do about security? 
 Individual components evolve via revisions (e.g., security patches) 
 Individual components are updated with functionally enhanced 
versions; 
 Individual components are replaced by alternative components; 
 Component interfaces evolve; 
 System architecture and configuration evolve; 
 System functional and security requirements evolve; 
 System security policies, mechanisms, security components, and 
system configuration parameter settings also change over time. 
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Current security approaches 
 Mandatory access control lists, firewalls; 
 Multi-level security; 
 Authentication (including certificate authority and passwords); 
 Cryptographic support (including public key certificates); 
 Encapsulation (including virtualization), hardware confinement (memory, 
storage, and external device isolation), and type enforcement capabilities; 
 Secure programming practices; 
 Data content or control signal flow logging/auditing; 
 Honey-pots, traps, sink-holes; 
 Security technical information guides for configuring the security 
parameters for applications and operating systems; 
 Functionally equivalent but diverse multi-variant software executables. 
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What acquisition research is needed 
for security? 
 How to verify the security of OA system designs 
throughout acquisition life cycle: system development, 
deployment, and post-deployment support. 
 
 How to validate the effectiveness of OA system security 
measures and knowledge of vulnerabilities into the 
ongoing development for systems in an operational, 
testable form that system integrators and administrators 
can employ, and acquisition program managers can 
assess. 
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Specifying the security requirements 
for software systems 
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Carefully specifying security policy 
obligations and rights 
 The obligation for a user to verify his/her authority to see compartment T, 
by password or other specified authentication process 
 The obligation for all components connected to specified component C to 
grant it the capability to read and update data in compartment T 
 The obligation to reconfigure a system in response to detected threats, 
when given the right to select and include different component versions, or 
executable component variants. 
 The right to read and update data in compartment T using the licensed 
component 
 The right to add, update, replace specified component D in a specified 
configuration 
 The right to add, update, or remove a security mechanism 
 The right to update security policy L. 
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Case Study: 
Securing software product lines 
within an OA software ecosystem 
for enterprise systems 
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Software product lines? 
 When functionally similar software components, 
connectors, or configurations exist,  
 Such that equivalent alternatives, versions, or 
variants may be substituted for one another, 
then 
 We have a strong relationship among these OA 
system elements that is called a software 
product line. 
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Software ecosystem of producers and the software components for 
an enterprise system 
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Framework for specifying multi-level 
OA system security policy 
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A design-time specification of an OA enterprise system that 
accommodates multiple alternative system configurations 
15 
Software product line that provides alternative, functionally similar 
components compatible with the reference design-time architecture 
16 
A build-time deployment selection among alternative components that 
produce an integrated enterprise system within the product line 
17 
A security capability specification encapsulating the run-time 
configuration instance via multiple virtual machines (e.g., using Xen)  
18 
An end-user run-time deployment version of selected components 
within enterprise system product line utilizing security library, 
SELinux, for enforcing mandatory obligations and rights. 
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 Updated post-deployment system configuration, using alternative but 
functionally similar components within enterprise system product line 
20 
An end-user view of the updated alternative run-time system 
configuration 
21 
Discussion and conclusions 
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Discussion 
 Our goal is to develop and demonstrate a new 
approach to address challenges in the acquisition of 
secure OA software systems.  
 Program managers, acquisition officers and contract 
managers will increasingly be called on to provide 
review and approval of security measures that are 
employed during the design, implementation, and 
deployment of OA systems.  
 We seek to make this a simpler, more transparent, 
and more tractable process. 
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Conclusions (1) 
 Our research demonstrates how complex OA systems can be 
designed, built, and deployed with alternative components and 
connectors into functionally similar system versions, to realize for 
overall system security.  
 We described a scheme to specify and realize OA system 
configurations that are compatible with existing security mechanisms. 
 Our scheme does not assume that individual system elements 
must be secure before inclusion into the secured OA system’s 
configuration. 
 Central to our scheme are software product line concepts integrated 
with security mechanisms.  
 We provided a case study that reveals how to specify a secure OA 
enterprise system product line accommodating diverse needs of 





 Articulate the process how to simply and transparently 
specify and assess OA system security using 
streamlined security policies.  
 Develop and demonstrate a prototype automated 
environment that can support the modeling and 
analysis of OA system security policies and alternative 
version OA system configurations, in ways that 
address the diverse needs of acquisition managers, 
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